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Abstract
We present a model of dynamic monopoly pricing for a good that displays network eﬀects. In
contrast with the standard notion of a rational-expectations equilibrium, we model consumers
as boundedly rational, and unable either to pay immediate attention to each price change, or to
make accurate forecasts of the adoption of the network good. Our analysis shows that the seller’s
optimal price trajectory has the following simple structure: the price is zero when the product
user base is below a specific threshold, and is chosen to keep user base stationary once this
threshold demand level has been attained. We show that our prescribed pricing policy is robust
to a number of extensions, which include the product’s user base evolving over time, a fraction of
consumers being suﬃciently rational to make accurate adoption forecasts, and consumers basing
their choices on a mixture of a myopic and a "stubborn" expectation of adoption. Our results
diﬀer significantly from those that would be predicted by a model based on rational-expectations
equilibrium, and are more consistent with the pricing of network goods observed in practice.
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1 Introduction
An important simplifying assumption made in economic models of network eﬀects is that con-
sumers are perfectly rational. This assumption is important in such models because the value
to each consumer of a good or service that displays network eﬀects (henceforth referred to as a
"network good") is influenced by the consumption choices made by some or all other consumers.
The solutions to such models are typically based on asserting the following "unboundedly" rational
behavior: (a) consumers immediately react to each observable strategic decision made by a seller,
and (b) having observed this decision, consumers form a common expectation of demand, and
make their consumption choices unilaterally based on this expectation, which is then realized in
equilibrium. This solution is commonly referred to as satisfying "fulfilled expectations", or as a
"rational expectations equilibrium".
Some notion of perfect rationality is at the base of most current economic analysis, even though
most researchers accept that agents are not in reality unboundedly rational. Such models continue
to be used, perhaps because there is an implicit belief that the ‘output’ of analysis based on
the approximation of unboundedly rationality agents is (reasonably) correct. In the specific case
of network goods, however, many predictions of models based on unboundedly rational behavior
do not appear to be a good description of reality. For example, it is believed that outcomes in
markets for network goods are often path-dependent, and therefore, the dynamics of the adoption
process and the path of choices made by a seller are important determinants of eventual outcomes.
This would not be the case were consumers able to form rational expectations after each price
change. It is therefore possible that managers, upon observing these aspects of real-world network
markets, would hesitate to rely on the prescriptions of models that ascribe the extent of rationality,
coordination and prediction accuracy that characterizes unboundedly rational behavior.
Our objective in this paper is to examine how the predictions of models of network eﬀects
change, if at all, under assumptions about consumer rationality that seem more realistic. We do so
by presenting alternative models of demand for a network good, in which consumers are cognitively
bounded, do not immediately react to every change in the seller’s price, and furthermore, make
their consumption choices based on a boundedly rational assessment of expected demand, which
may depend on the current price, the current level of demand, and/or an exogenously specified
"stubborn" expectation of equilibrium demand. We use these models of bounded rationality to
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study the dynamic pricing problem for a monopoly seller of a network good. The adoption choices
of the consumers continuously influence the rate at which demand adjusts over time, and the
monopoly seller therefore chooses the price trajectory that maximizes her discounted stream of
profits. The rate at which demand adjusts over time is also aﬀected by a parameter λ which is
proportional to the fraction of consumers in each period who "pay attention" to the current price.
Our first theorem shows that when consumers are myopic in their expectations, the monopolist’s
optimal pricing trajectory is generated by a target policy with the following properties: when
current demand is below the target, the price is zero; when current demand is above the target, the
price is the maximum possible; and when current demand is at the target, the price is chosen to
keep demand stationary. The target could be interpreted as the level of adoption below which the
monopolist invests in building a user base, and above which the monopolist profits from exploiting
her installed base. The result thus prescribes an extreme form of penetration pricing that is not
uncommon in markets for network goods.
This theorem also shows that the optimal demand target with myopic consumers is always
strictly lower than the equilibrium level of demand predicted by a model with rational expectations.
The diﬀerence between the target demand and the rational expectations equilibrium demand is a
decreasing function of λ, and tends to zero as λ increases without bound, i.e., when all consumers
react to price changes infinitely fast. We briefly discuss how the results of the theorem are aﬀected
when the distribution of consumer types is nonuniform, although we do not present this extension
in detail.
Our subsequent results extend this theorem along two directions. First, we examine how the
monopolist’s optimal price trajectory varies when the population of consumers evolves over time.
That is, in each period, a constant fraction of consumers is replaced by new ones, or there is an
exogenous source of replacement in the population of potential customers, at a rate determined by
a parameter c that is proportional to the fraction of consumers replaced in each period. Our second
theorem establishes that the monopolist’s optimal pricing trajectory continues to be generated by
a target policy with the same properties as the one derived in Theorem 1, although with a strictly
lower optimal demand target. Moreover, in this model, the price that keeps demand stationary at
any desired level is progressively lower as c increases, and we discuss how this diﬀerentiates the
eﬀect of changes in the rate of replacement c, from corresponding changes in the rate of "attention"
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λ.
In parallel, we establish the extent to which the prescribed price trajectory from our first
theorem is robust to alternative models of bounded rationality. First, we generalize the result to
the case in which the population of consumers contains both those who are myopic and those who
are "fully rational." For this model, the results are qualitatively the same as for the case in which all
consumers are myopic, but with a faster rate of adjustment. We then examine how the monopolist’s
optimal price trajectory varies when the expectation of demand formed by each consumer who pays
attention is a weighted average of the myopic expectation and an exogenously specified "stubborn"
expectation. Our final theorem establishes that, again, the monopolist’s optimal pricing trajectory
continues to be generated by a target policy with the same properties as the one derived in Theorem
1, with a lower target demand level. The target increases as consumers become less stubborn,
eventually converging to the target demand level of the policy for purely myopic consumers.
We have organized the rest of this paper as follows. Section 2 describes our model of bounded
rationality, our underlying discrete-time model, and the derivation of its continuous-time coun-
terpart. Section 3 analyzes our "base" model with myopic consumers, derives the optimal price
trajectory for this model, and contrasts its results with those predicted by the rational-expectations
model. Section 4 extends the base model in three ways, incorporating in turn an evolving consumer
base, a mixture of myopic and rational consumers, and a model of rationality in which consumers
are "stubborn", and showing that the results of Section 3 are robust to each of these extensions.
Section 5 concludes, and the Appendix contains those proofs not presented in the main body of the
paper.
2 Overview of Our Model
2.1 Models of Bounded Rationality
We derive our continuous-time formulation as the limiting case of a discrete-time model. A network
good is provided by a monopolist, who sells the good one period at a time. (Think of the good
as a service.) The length of each period is h, and therefore time is indexed as t = 0, h, 2h, ...
The monopolist announces a price p(t) a the beginning of each period. We assume that the price,
p(t), is constrained to be nonnegative, and is bounded above (more on this later). A unit mass
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of a continuum of consumers is indexed by a "type" parameter θ in the unit interval. Let q(t)
denote the mass of consumers who pruchase the service during period t. A consumer of type θ
who purchases the service during period t realizes a "net incremental utility" or "surplus" equal
to θq(t) − p(t). Thus θ is the marginal value to the consumer of the "network eﬀect." Our basic
assumption throughout the paper is that θ is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. However,
in Section 3.3 we report some results for nonuniform distributions of θ.
In the process of deciding whether or not to purchase the service, the consumers are boundedly
rational. The first aspect of this bounded rationality is that of bounded attention. In each period, a
random fraction λh of consumers of each type "pay attention to" the price p(t), where 0 < λh < 1.
(Since in the continuous-time model we shall let h tend to zero, the last inequality will not constrain
λ in an essential way.) Correspondingly, the remaining fraction (1− λh) of consumers of each type
do not respond to the monopolist’s price announcement, and their choice remains unchanged from
what it was during the previous period. Notice that an equal fraction λh of consumers of each type
"pay attention" in each period, and that the magnitude of this fraction depends on the length of
the interval h. Thus the average time between successive price checks by a consumer of any type
is (1/λh). One might therefore also interpret λh as a "rate of adjustment" to changes in prices.
However, the constraint λh < 1 bounds this rate of adjustment in the discrete-time model.
The second aspect of bounded rationality in our model specifies how consumers who are paying
attention form their expectation of what the demand q(t) will be. Specifically, each consumer who
notices the price p(t) at the beginning of period t makes the same prediction, qE(t, h), of the total
demand in period t. Therefore, a consumer of type θ who notices p(t)will buy the good if and only
if θqE(t, h) ≥ p(t). In subsequent sections we explore the implications of a few simple models of
expectations formation. In particular, we shall study a model of "myopic expectation," in which
qE(t, h) = q(t− h).
2.2 A Continuous Time Model
Our analysis uses a continuous-time version of the discrete-time model described above, which
is derived as a limiting case of the discrete-time model, as h → 0. Our motivation for using a
continuous-time model is two-fold. First, if consumers do not correctly forecast the demand in the
coming period, then as noted above, the discrete-time model has a built-in implicit minimum one-
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period lag of adjustment in demand, so the speed of adjustment is bounded. In the continuous-time
model, the speed of adjustment is determined by the parameter λ, and may be taken to be as large
as one likes. Second, a continuous-time model, although requiring more advanced mathematical
methods, typically yields solutions with simpler dynamics (e.g., by avoiding the phenomenon of
overshooting).
To begin, let
qE(t) = lim
h→0
qE(t, h),
and assume that qE(t) is well-defined. In the present paper, qE(t) will depend at most on the
current demand and price, q(t) and p(t), respectively, although one can imagine plausible models
in which it depends on the history of demand and price, as well (see, e.g., Radner and Richardson,
2003). We shall also assume that p(t) ≤ qE(t). This is plausible, since if p(t) > qE(t) then the price
would exceed every consumer’s willingness-to-pay. (See further remarks about this assumption in
Section 3.)
The resulting time-rate of change of demand is described in our first lemma. An intuitive
understanding of how the discrete-time formulation is related to its continuous-time counterpart
may help the reader interpret subsequent results more easily, and we therefore present the lemma’s
proof in the main body of the paper.
The third line of (1) in the Lemma is actually an assumption. In part, it reflects the fact (noted
above) that, if p(t) > qE(t) then p(t) exceeds every consume willingness-to-pay. It could be argued
that this would not aﬀect the behavior of those consumers who are not currently "paying attention"
to the price, and hence a price above qE(t) need not drive all consumers out of the market. The third
line of (1) actually makes a stronger statement: if p(t) > qE(t) then every consumer will expect all
the subscribers to unsubscribe immediately. It’s as if a price above qE(t) were a "wake-up call."
This has the eﬀect of imposing on the monopolist the constraint that the current price must not
exceed the current expectation of total demand. This discontinuous behavior can be thought of
as an approximation to a more realistic model in which the parameter λ is itself some increasing
function of the current price. In any case, for the model to be well-behaved some upper bound on
price is required, and this approximation has the advantage of leading to a more tractable model.
In the third line of (1) we also impose the constraint that the price must be nonnegative. Other
finite lower bounds could be imposed without changing the qualitative nature of our results.
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Lemma 1 If at time t (≥ 0) the demand and price are q(t) and p(t), respectively, then the time-rate
of change of demand is specified by:
q0(t) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, q(t) = 0,
λ {Q[qE(t), p(t)]− q(t)} , 0 < q(t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p(t) ≤ qE(t),
−∞, 0 < q(t) ≤ 1, p(t) > qE(t),
, (1)
where
Q(x, p) ≡ 1− p
x
, 0 < x ≤ 1. (2)
Proof. First, when q(t) = 0, the product is of no value to all consumers, which yields the
first line of (1). Next, suppose the demand from consumers of type θ in period t is denoted by
w(θ, t). Recall that a fraction λh of consumers of type θ notice p(t), form a shared expectation
of demand qE(t, h), and decide whether or not to adopt the product for period t. Therefore, if
θ ≥ [p(t)/qE(t, h)], each consumer in this fraction λh adopts the product, and if θ < [p(t)/qE(t, h)],
then none of these consumers adopt the product. Since the remaining fraction (1 − λh) continue
to do in period t what they were doing in period t− h, it follows that:
w(θ, t) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
λh+ (1− λh)w(θ, t− h), θ ≥ p(t)/qE(t, h),
(1− λh)w(θ, t− h) θ < p(t)/qE(t, h),
, (3)
and therefore,
w(θ, t)−w(θ, t− h) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
λh[1− w(θ, t− h)], θ ≥ p(t)/qE(t, h),
−λh[w(θ, t− h)], θ < p(t)/qE(t, h).
. (4)
Dividing both sides by h and letting h tend to zero yields the time rate of change of demand for
consumers of type θ:
dw(θ, t)
dt
≡ lim
h→0
µ
w(θ, t)− w(θ, t− h)
h
¶
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
λ[1− w(θ, t)], θ ≥ p(t)/qE(t),
−λ[w(θ, t)], θ < p(t)/qE(t).
(5)
Recall that θ is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Hence
q(t) =
1Z
0
w(θ, t)dθ, (6)
it follows that
q0(t) =
1Z
0
µ
dw(θ, t)
dt
¶
dθ, (7)
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so by (5) and (7),
q0(t) =
p(t)/qE(t)Z
0
−λ[w(θ, t)]dθ +
1Z
p(t)/qE(t),
λ[1− w(θ, t)]dθ, (8)
which simplifies to
q0(t) = λ
∙
1− p(t)
qE(t)
¸
−
1Z
0
λw(θ, t)dθ, (9)
and using (6), this yields the second line of (1), which completes the proof of the second line of 1.
Note that the third line of (1) is equivalent to
0 ≤ p(t) ≤ qE(t). (10)
We also assume, for simplicity, that the marginal cost of providing the service is zero. The monop-
olist chooses the price trajectory p(t) to maximize her total discounted profit (revenue),Z ∞
0
e−rtp(t)q(t)dt, (11)
subject to (10), where r > 0 is her given discount rate, and q(t) evolves according to (1).
2.3 Rational-Expectations Equiibrium
A standard alternative theory of consumer behavior in models of network eﬀects is embodied in the
concept of fulfilled-expectations, or rational-expectations equilibrium. In this section, we describe
the rational-expectations equilibrium for our model that is optimal for the monopolist, since it is a
natural benchmark for the results of the models with boundedly-rational consumers.
Imagine that, when faced with a price p, each consumer notices p, correctly predicts the total
demand q at that price, and decides whether or not to subscribe on the basis of that prediction.
This is consistent with consumers who are unboundedly rational, and is the behavior assumed
by most models of network eﬀects. Following standard terminology, we call such a pair (q, p), a
rational expectations equilibrium (REE). In what follows, we do not impose the constraint that
p ≤ q, although it will turn out that for the interesting REEs the constraint will be satisfied.
First, notice that a prediction of q = 0 made by all consumers is a correct prediction for any
price p, and therefore, (0, p) is an REE for any p ∈ [0, 1]. Next, for a prediction q > 0 to be correct,
8
it must satisfy
q =
µ
1− p
q
¶
, (12)
since the expression on the right-hand side of (12) is the realized demand when the demand pre-
diction is q [cf. (2)]. For 0 ≤ p < 1/4, this equation has two real solutions,
q =
1± (1− 4p)1/2
2
,
which are strictly positive and, incidentally, satisfy p < q. Alternatively, define the function P (q)
using (12) as
q =
µ
1− P (q)
q
¶
, (13)
or
P (q) = q(1− q). (14)
Therefore, the pair [q, P (q)] is an REE for each q ∈ [0, 1].
We will make the standard assumption that if there are multiple REE’s that correspond to a
particular price, customers will coordinate on the one with the highest predicted demand. Under
this assumption, define the optimal REE as the one that maximizes the monopolist’s instantaneous
profits pq. It follows that
q∗ = argmax
q
qP (q), (15)
p∗ = P (q∗), (16)
and computing the solution to the optimization problem (15) yields
q∗ = (2/3), p∗ = (2/9). (17)
Furthermore, since all consumers notice each price change instantaneously and react ratio-
nally to the price change, demand adjusts to any new price instantaneously, independent of past
prices/demand, and the demand-price pair at each instant is an REE, for any price trajectory the
monopolist chooses. But there is a unique optimal REE; thus, there is no reason for the monopolist
to vary her price over time. We have therefore shown:
Lemma 2 When consumers are unboundedly rational, the monopolist’s optimal price trajectory is
p(t) = p∗, q(t) = q∗ for all t ≥ 0, where (q∗, p∗) is the optimal rational-expectations equilibrium
(17).
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3 Myopic Consumers
3.1 The Model
This section describes the monopolist’s optimal price trajectory for a class of models of bounded
rationality in which, in our underlying discrete-time model, every consumers’ expectation of total
demand during period t equals the actual demand in the previous period. Thus, in the discrete-time
model,
qE(t, h) = q(t− h). (18)
Recall that θ is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Corresponding to Lemma 1, the
continuous-time approximation is
qE(t) = q(t), (19)
and therefore, if at time t the demand and price are q(t) and p(t), respectively, then the time-rate
of change of demand is specified by
q0(t) = m(q(t), p(t)), (20)
where:
m(q, p) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, q = 0,
λ
∙
1− p
q
− q
¸
, 0 < q ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p ≤ q,
−∞, 0 < q ≤ 1, p > q.
, (21)
If one examines the first two lines of (21), it becomes apparent that each REE is also a stationary
point of the demand-price process (and vice versa) when consumers are myopic, for any λ > 0. That
is, (q, p) is an REE if and only if m(q, p) = 0. In subsequent sections, we therefore often refer to
P (q) in (14) as the "stay-where-you-are" price.
3.2 The Optimal Price Trajectory: A Target Policy
In this section, we establish that the monopolist’s optimal price trajectory is generated by a policy
that belongs to family that we call target policies. We shall analyze the maximization problem in
(11) using the method of dynamic programming, in which the state variable is the current demand.
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First, by Blackwell’s Theorem, there is no loss in restricting our attention to stationary policies,
i.e., policies for which the current price at any time is a function of the current state only:
p(t) = μ[q(t)]. (22)
Note that the function μ does not change in time. Of course, a policy is admissible only if the
diﬀerential equation (1) has a unique solution starting from any initial state q(0).
With some abuse of notation, we refer to the value of demand at time zero as q. The value of
a policy μ at an initial state q(0) = q is the corresponding profit,
Vμ (q) =
Z ∞
0
e−rtμ[q(t)]q(t)dt, q(0) = q. (23)
Define
V (q) = sup
μ
Vμ (q) , (24)
where the supremum is over all admissible policies μ. A policy is optimal if its profit attains the
supremum at every state q.
Recall that the pair [q, P (q)] is a stationary point for the demand-price process. Define the
(stationary) target policy with target s (0 < s < 1) by
π(q) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, q < s,
P (q), q = s,
q, q > s.
(25)
If the initial state is less than the target s, then the demand will increase until it reaches the target,
during which time the profit is zero. After than, the demand per unit time will remain at the
target, and the profit will be sP (s). Hence the total discounted profit will be
∞Z
T
e−rtsP (s)dt = e−rt
∙
sP (s)
r
¸
, (26)
where T is the time at which demand reaches the target s. Note that there is a tradeoﬀ between
choosing a higher target and reaching it sooner. Similarly, if the initial state is greater than the
target s, then the demand will decrease until it reaches the target, and the total discounted profit
will be:
TZ
0
e−rt[q(t)]2dt+
∞Z
T
e−rtsP (s)dt, (27)
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where T is the time at which demand reaches the target s, and until that time q(t) is determined
by the simple linear diﬀerential equation
q0(t) = −λq(t).
Let π∗ be the optimal target policy. Our first theorem establishes that π∗ is optimal among all
policies, and therefore determines the seller’s optimal price trajectory.
Theorem 1 The optimal target policy π∗ is optimal among all policies, and the optimal target is
σ ≡ 2λ
3λ+ r
. (28)
Therefore, when current demand is below the target level σ, the monopolist charges a price of zero
until it reaches its demand target σ, and then raises its price to the steady-state price,
P (σ) =
2λ(λ+ r)
(3λ+ r)2
. (29)
If current demand is above the target level, the monopolist charges the maximum possible price
(equal to the current demand), until demand reaches the target level, at which point it lowers its
price to the steady-state price in (29).
[Note: While the case in which the initial demand exceeds the target would typically manageri-
ally less relevant than the case in which it is less than the target, the characterization of the policy
for q > σ is necessary to compute the value function V (q) in each state, so that we can establish
that the policy is indeed optimal.]
Although Theorem 1 is a limiting case of both Theorems 2 and 3 (see Section 4), we nevertheless
present a complete proof in Appendix A. A first managerial implication of Theorem 1 is the extent
to which it diﬀers from the corresponding REE solution. Rather than choosing a positive price and
asserting that rational consumer expectations will induce instantaneous demand adjustment, the
result indicates that the seller must pro-actively establish a user base. Furthermore, it prescribes
an "extreme" penetration pricing policy — pricing at the lowest possible level until reaching a pre-
specified demand target — as being the optimal price trajectory for establishing this user base. The
target can be interpreted as the level of adoption below which the monopolist invests in building a
user base, and above which the monopolist profits from her installed base. Notice that this pricing
policy is optimal among all possible trajectories. Moreover, it is easily understandable, simple to
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Steady-state 
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as the demand 
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Steady-state 
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as the demand 
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*q
Direction of change in σ as λ decreases (for a fixed r)
Figure 1: Illustrates how the demand target and steady-state price vary with changes in the "rate
of attention" λ.
implement, and appears to be qualitatively consistent with those observed in practice for network
goods.
The expression in (28) establishes that when r = 0, the optimal demand target σ is equal to
the REE demand q∗. Furthermore, for all finite r,
lim
λ→∞
σ = q∗, (30)
and therefore, the REE outcome is a limiting case of the outcome in our model. For any finite
rate of adjustment λ and positive discount rate r, (28) also establishes that the demand target σ
is strictly lower than q∗.
Clearly, the optimal demand target in (28) increases in the "rate of attention" λ. However,
the steady-state price is not monotonic in λ. As λ progressively decreases from ∞ (that is, as
consumers become increasingly cognitively bounded), the steady-state price first increases and
then subsequently decreases. This is depicted in Figure 1. More precisely, for rates of attention
λ > r, the decrease in the demand target that a lowering of λ induces allows the seller to charge a
higher price while still keeping its user base stationary at σ. However, for lower rates of attention
(λ < r), the fact that a smaller and smaller fraction of customers are paying attention forces the
seller to lower its price in order to maintain its desired target user base.
Despite the potential decrease in steady-state price P (σ) as λ increases, it is straightforward to
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verify that the seller’s steady-state profits increase monotonically with λ:
Corollary 1 The steady-state discounted profit,
V (σ) =
2λ2(λ+ r)
(3λ+ r)3
, (31)
is increasing in λ. Furthermore, if the seller’s initial user base q(0) is strictly lower than its demand
target σ, the seller’s discounted profit,
V (q0) =
1
r
µ
1− q0
1− σ
¶−( rλ)
σ2(1− σ), (32)
is also increasing in λ.
Thus, rather than being able to exploit the fact that its consumers do not pay attention to price
changes, the seller is always adversely aﬀected, and progressively more so as consumers become
"more" boundedly rational (that is, as λ decreases). While we specify λ as an exogenous "rate of
attention", it may be possible in practice for a seller to influence the rate of attention by making
costly advertising investments. Studying this tradeoﬀ is an interesting direction for future research.
Additionally, since the optimal policy is a target policy, the demand-price process eventually
will "settle down" at the stationary point [σ, P (σ)]. As we have noted in Section 2.2, any stationary
point of this process is a rational-expectations equilibrium (although not an optimal one). If one
interprets the output of a static model of network eﬀects as the steady-state of some underlying
dynamic model (whose details have not been explicitly presented), this indicates that the use of
static rational-expectations outcomes in this way is not entirely inconsistent with our model; only
that the choice of the optimal REE is incorrect.
3.3 Nonuniform distributions of consumer type
In this subsection we comment briefly on the possible generalizations of the preceding model to
cases with nonuniform distributions of the "type" parameter θ. (For a detailed account of these
generalizations, see Radner and Sundararajan, 2005.)
First, in the preceding subsection it was shown that the steady-state demand in the monopolist’s
optimal price trajectory is strictly lower than q∗, the optimal REE demand, although the price that
maintains this steady-state demand may be lower or higher than p∗, the optimal REE price. Ths
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observation is more generally true in the following sense: For any (suﬃciently regular) customer
type distribution, the optimal REE is not a steady state for an optimal policy in the model of myopic
consumers.
Second, if the cumulative distribution function of θ is strictly concave, one needs to admit
"measure-valued controls," and the optimal policy is a "generalized target policy" with the same
target as in (28), independent of the actual distribution function. When current demand is below
the target, the price is zero; when current demand is above the target, the price is the maximum
possible, and when current demand is at the target, the monopolist chooses the "mixture" between
a price of zero and the maximum possible price that keeps demand stationary. In practice this would
mean that, when the demand is in the neighborhood of the target, the price fluctuates irregulary
between high and low values, which is suggestive of the phenomenon of frequent "sales."
We have also studied the case in which the cumulative distribution function of θ is convex, but
thus far we have only partial results for this case. They suggest that, again, the optimal policy has
a "target demand," but in the approach to that target from below, the price may rise gradually
towards the steady-state price at the target (with a symmetric phenomenon when the approach to
the target demand is from above.) In particular, we have a complete solution for a piecewise linear
convex cumulative distribution function that has this property.
4 Extensions of the Model of Myopic Consumers
We now present three extensions to our model of myopic consumers. In each extension, we maintain
the assumptions on bounded attention and the distribution of consumer types. Each extension
establishes that the seller’s optimal price trajectory retains the structure derived in Theorem 1,
although the level of the demand target and steady-state price vary across the three cases.
4.1 An Evolving Consumer Population
The first extension we consider is a situation in which, rather than being static, the population
of potential customers for the network good evolves over time. We return to the discrete-time
model of Section 2 to characterize this precisely, while maintaining each of its other assumptions.
Therefore, the length of each period is h, and time is indexed by t = {0, h, 2h, ...}. A fraction ch
15
of consumers of each type (both adopters and non-adopters) is replaced in each period. That is, a
fraction ch of existing consumers "leave" and an equal fraction ch of new consumers "arrive" and
are added to the pool of potential customers (clearly, each customer in the latter fraction is not an
adopter). The size of the total set of potential customers therefore remains constant, although it
has a constant "rate of replacement", which is proportional to the parameter c.
Following this replacement at the beginning of each period, we continue to assume that an equal
fraction λh of consumers of each type pay attention in each period, and an equal fraction (1− λh)
do not. Proceeding as in Section 2.2, the time-rate of change in demand in a continuous-time
approximation of this discrete-time model is described in Lemma 4:
Lemma 3 If at time t, the demand and price are q(t) and p(t), respectively, then the time-rate of
change of demand is specified by q0(t) = m(q(t), p(t)), where,
m(q, p) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, q(t) = 0,
λ
∙
1− p
q
¸
− (λ+ c)q, 0 < q ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p ≤ q,
−∞, 0 < q ≤ 1, p > q,
(33)
The positive rate of consumer replacement therefore slows down the rate at which demand
increases, for any price trajectory that causes an increase in demand. Next, proceeding as in
Section 3.2, it follows that the "stay-where-you-are" price is
P (q) = q[1−
³
1 +
c
λ
´
q], (34)
and a stationary target policy π with target σ (0 < σ < 1) is defined by
π(q) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, q < σ,
P (σ), q = σ,
q, q > σ.
. (35)
Our second main result shows that the seller’s optimal price trajectory continues to be generated
by a target policy, although with a strictly lower demand target:
Theorem 2 The seller’s optimal price trajectory is generated by a target policy, and the optimal
demand target is
σ =
2λ
3(λ+ c) + r
. (36)
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Figure 2: Illustrates how the "stay-where-you-are" pricing function varies with an increase in the
rate of consumer churn c, and the corresponding impact of such an increase on the optimal demand
target and steady-state price.
Therefore, when current demand is below the target level σ, the monopolist charges a price of zero
until it reaches its demand target σ, and then raises its price to the steady-state price
P (σ) =
2λ[(λ+ c+ r)]
[3(λ+ c) + r]2
. (37)
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in the Appendix.
The comparative statics results for changes in λ of Section 3.2 continue to hold for this extension.
An interesting contrast between "losing consumers" and "losing attention" is illustrated in Figure
2. Notice in (36) that as the rate at which consumers are replaced, c, increases, the demand target
becomes lower, and this is similar to the eﬀect of a decrease in the rate at which consumers pay
attention to price changes. However, an increase in c also shifts the "stay-where you are" price
curve downward, which decreases the seller’s steady-state revenue. We state this formally as:
Corollary 2 The steady-state price (37) and seller”s revenue are strictly decreasing in the "rate
of consumer replacement" c.
These results imply that a shift in c that decreases the demand target to a specific level has a
more adverse eﬀect on a seller than a shift in λ that decreases the demand target to the same level.
Put another way, the impact of an increase in the consumer replacement rate is, in a sense, more
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detrimental to a seller than a corresponding change in the rate of attention.
4.2 Myopic and Rational Consumers
Our next extension examines a situation in which some consumers are myopic and some are fully
rational. Again, we start with a discrete-time model and move to a continuous-time approximation.
Formally, suppose that in a period of length h a fraction λh of the consumers myopically adjust
their demands, and another fraction μh of the consumers can predict the total demand in the next
period. This give rise to the diﬀerence equation
q(t) = λh
∙
1− p(t)
q(t− h)
¸
+ μh
∙
1− p(t)
q(t)
¸
+ (1− λh− μh)q(t− h),
0 < q(t− h), (38)
0 ≤ p(t) ≤ min{q(t− h), q(t)}.
Hence
q(t)− q(t− h) = λh
∙
1− p(t)
q(t− h)
¸
+ μh
∙
1− p(t)
q(t)
¸
− (λh+ μh)q(t− h), (39)
q(t)− q(t− h)
h
= (λ+ ϕ)− λp(t)
q(t− h) −
μp(t)
q(t)
− (λ+ μ)q(t− h). (40)
Letting h tend to zero, we get
q0(t) = (λ+ μ)
∙
1− p(t)
q(t)
− q(t)
¸
. (41)
Thus we get the same law of motion as in the "purely myopic" case (μ = 0), except that λ has been
replace by (λ+ μ). Hence we see that in this model what matters is the total rate of adaptation,
(λ + μ), not how the "adapters" are distributed between myopic and fully rational consumers.
The pricing trajectory prescribed by Theorem 1 therefore continues to be optimal, with λ simply
replaced by (λ+ μ).
4.3 Myopic and "Stubborn" Consumers
Finally, we describes some properties of the monopolist’s optimal price trajectory when consumers
are something between being myopic and being "stubborn". Rather than basing their expectation of
total demand in the next period on the current period’s demand level, consumers who pay attention
to the monopolist’s price announcement partly base their prediction on a stubborn assessment, ω, of
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the total demand for the good. The extent to which they base their expectation on ω is determined
by a parameter γ, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, and
qE(t, h) = γq(t− h) + (1− γ)ω. (42)
Proceeding as in Sections 2.1 and 3.2, it follows that
qE(t) = γq(t) + (1− γ)ω, (43)
the law of motion is
m(q, p) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, q = 0,
λ
∙
1− p
γq + (1− γ)ω − q
¸
, 0 < q ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p ≤ γq + (1− γ)ω,
−∞, 0 < q ≤ 1, p > q,
(44)
and the "stay-where-you-are" price is
P (q) = (1− q)[γq + (1− γ)ω]. (45)
A stationary target policy π with target σ (0 < σ < 1) is defined by
π(q) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, q < σ,
P (σ), q = σ,
γq + (1− γ)ω, q > σ.
. (46)
For a given γ and ω, let π∗ be the optimal target policy, and denote its target as σ(γ, ω). Our final
theorem confirms that the structure of the pricing policy prescribed in Section 3 is robust to this
extension as well, although, independent of the value of ω, the demand target is always lower.
Theorem 3 (a) The monopolist’s optimal price trajectory is generated by the target policy with
target σ(γ, ω).
(b) σ(γ,w)is strictly increasing in γ, and has the following values at its end points:
σ(0, ω) =
λ
2λ+ r
, (47)
σ(1, ω) =
2λ
3λ+ r
. (48)
(c) σ(γ, ω) is strictly decreasing in ω.
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Notice that the demand target of Theorem 1 is a limiting case of the demand target above,
when γ = 1. Parts (b) and (c) have a simple intuitive explanation. An increase in the installed
base for a network good benefits the seller in two ways: through the direct increase in demand,
and by increasing the willingness to pay of consumers. It is the latter property that increases the
monopoly demand for the good beyond what a normal good would enjoy. Therefore, at any given
stubborn expectation ω, a decrease in the weight γ placed on the current demand makes the good
seem "less like" a network good, and more like a normal good with an exogenously specified value
that is proportionate to ω, thus reducing the steady-state user base that the seller finds optimal.
Correspondingly, for any given γ, an increase in ω reduces the fraction of perceived user value that
is influenced by actual current demand, and increases the corresponding fraction influenced by the
"stubborn" expectation. One might therefore expect outcomes that are qualitatively similar to
those of Theorem 3 in the base model of Section 3.2 if, rather than being a pure network good as
we have assumed, a fraction of the willingness-to-pay for the good is independent of the demand q.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have explored several variations of a model of optimal dynamic monopoly pricing of a network
good with assumptions about consumer rationality that are more realistic than those embodied in
the theory of rational expectations. Our results predict that when consumers cannot form correct
demand expectations, or pay attention to every price announcement, a seller must establish a user
base by pricing as low as is possible until reaching a desired stationary target demand level. This
outcome is quite diﬀerent from what is obtained from a model in which the process of demand
adjustment is due to the correct formation of expectations by rational consumers after each prices
announcement. Moreover, our prescribed price path seems to be similar to those commonly observed
in practice.
We have shown that our main results are robust to a number of extensions. During our analysis
of these extensions, we contrast how the demand target and the price that keeps demand steady
vary with changes in the rate at which myopic consumers pay attention to price changes, and
the rate at which there is turnover in the potential consumer base. Similarly, we have examined
how the target demand and the steady-state price vary with the extent to which these myopic
consumers base their assessment of future demand on a stubborn expectation, and the level of
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this expectation. While the extent to which each of these parameters characterize specific network
goods and industries is an empirical question, managers who assess these parameters appropriately
for their products can use our theory as a general basis on which to fine-tune the details of their
pricing strategy.
Natural extensions to our theory would model competing network goods, or myopic consumers
who make imperfect observations of demand. Additionally, we model the rate of attention and
the rate of replacement as exogenous variables, although sellers may in fact be able to influence
these by making advertising and branding investments. An interesting direction for future research
would be to extend our model to permit investments of this kind. This may also indicate how such
investments should vary over time, since the impact of a change in either parameter on the seller’s
profits depends on its timing.
Finally, building on recent models of local network eﬀects (Sundararajan, 2005b, Tucker, 2004),
the rate at which consumers pay attention to products may not be constant across the population,
but may be influenced by the adoption decisions of other consumers that one is locally "connected"
to. This represents an interesting extension to our model of bounded rationality, one that is
especially pertinent to network goods, and a direction of research we hope to pursue in the future.
6 Bibliographic Remarks and References
Our results add to a broad theoretical and applied literature on network eﬀects1. The seminal
papers, by Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and by Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), and a large
majority of the literature that followed, have focused more on analyses of oligopoly rather than
monopoly pricing, and in contrast with our paper, almost always use the model of consumer be-
havior embodied in the concept of rational expectations. An exposition of the theory of rational
expectations in economic analysis can be found in Radner (1982), and its use in defining "fulfilled-
expectations" outcomes in the presence of network eﬀects is described in Katz and Shapiro (1985).
The static model of network eﬀects underlying our dynamic model is based on Rohlfs (1974),
who provided the first model of monopoly pricing for a network good, and on the subsequent
exposition by Economides (1996). The discussion of dynamic pricing closest to ours that we are
1Comprehensive surveys of models of network eﬀects can be found in Farrell and Klemperer (2004), and in
Economides (1996).
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aware of is by Dhebar and Oren (1985). Their formulation diﬀers from ours in several respects,
but in general it can be interpreted as incorporating a kind of bounded rationality on the part of
the consumers. A special case of their model (Section 4 of their paper, with the parameter α = 0)
leads to a law of motion that is mathematically isomorphic to our benchmark case of purely myopic
consumers with a uniform distribution of types (Section 3.2 above), and for that case they derive
the optimal price trajectory. For their general model they discuss properties of the optimal price
trajectory if the initial customer base is “small,” and indicate that the monopolist will eventually
price to keep the demand at a steady state (what we would call a “target”), but they do not obtain
a complete characterization of the optimal policy. (For a related discussion, see Dhebar and Oren,
1986).
Cabral, Salant and Woroch (1999) study the dynamic pricing of a durable network good in
a two-stage model with rational consumers, where they illustrate how the presence of network
eﬀects may overturn Coasian dynamics and lead to first period pricing that is lower than second-
period pricing. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) model dynamic pricing by a monopolist who sells
a network good to overlapping generations of consumers who live for two periods, although they
assume perfect rationality on the part of their consumers. Related papers that study single-period
monopoly price discrimination based on a model of rational demand expectations include those by
Oren, Smith and Wilson (1982) and by Sundararajan (2004, 2005a).
Shared information systems often display network eﬀects, and our model may thus inform the
literature on the adoption of such systems. For example, Riggins, Kreibel and Mukhopadhyay
(1994) model the two-stage adoption of an interorganizational system with positive and negative
adoption externalities. While their model uses the standard notion of fulfilled expectations, they do
discuss a case with myopic adopters. They show that subsidies are often necessary to induce adop-
tion in the first stage, a result qualitatively similar to ours. Wang and Seidmann (1995) examine
a related problem for the adoption of EDI in a two-sided network of buyers and suppliers, incor-
porating not just positive network eﬀects from higher adoption, but negative (or "competitive")
externalities imposed by a buyer (supplier) on other buyers (suppliers) by their adoption; a similar
tradeoﬀ is modeled by Westland (1992) as well. Nault and Dexter (2005) provide a general model of
pricing by a monopoly provider of a "network alliance" service, wherein the number of adopters and
the investments made by these adopters each influence the demand for every adopter’s products.
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They show that, when combined with an exclusivity arrangement with participating members, the
provider’s optimal commission level restricts membership in the alliance.
The bounded rationality of agents in our model leads to a demand adjustment process that is
"viscous", and is similar in this regard to the model of Radner and Richardson (2003) and of Radner
(2003). These papers, however, model a good of constant value, and do not study network eﬀects
— rather, the rate at which demand adjusts to price announcements by sellers varies in proportion
to the magnitude of the diﬀerence between the announced price and each consumer’s willingness to
pay. A model of network eﬀects with boundedly rational consumers that is closely related to ours is
by Arthur (1989), who studies adoption choices between two competing durable network goods. In
his model, myopic consumers make their choices based on the current market share of each good.
He shows that over time, the market share of one of the goods will tend to 100%, though one cannot
predict ex-ante which of the two goods it would be, and outcomes are path-dependent. He does
not model the choice of price, dynamic or otherwise, instead implicitly assuming that prices are
fixed and exogenously specified. An extension of our model of bounded rationality to one with two
competing sellers of network goods may provide insight into whether his results continue to hold
when sellers can strategically alter their prices over time, although this extension remains unsolved
at this time.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider an arbitrary target policy, π, and let s denote the corresponding target. Suppose
that the initial state q is less than s. We shall first calculate the optimal target, s, starting from
q(0) = q. Until it reaches s, q(t) solves
q0(t) = λ[1− q(t)]. (49)
The unique solution to the diﬀerential equation in (49) with the initial condition q(0) = q is:
q(t) = 1− e−λt(1− q). (50)
As a consequence, if the initial state is q < s, the time T at which q(T ) = s solves
s = 1− e−λT (1− q), (51)
and therefore
T =
1
λ
log
µ
1− q
1− s
¶
. (52)
Therefore, under the policy π, the value function is:
Vπ(q) = sP (s)
⎛
⎝
∞Z
T
e−rtdt
⎞
⎠ , (53)
which simplifies to:
Vπ(q) =
1
r
µ
1− q
1− s
¶−( rλ)
s2(1− s). (54)
Equation (54) can be rewritten as:
Vπ(q) =
1
r
h
(1− q)−(
r
λ)
i h
s2(1− s)(1+
r
λ)
i
. (55)
Diﬀerentiating (55) with respect to s yields:
dVπ(q)
ds
=
1
r
h
(1− q)−( rλ)
i h
2s(1− s)(1+ rλ) −
h³
1 +
r
λ
´
s2(1− s)( rλ)
ii
. (56)
For 0 < s < 1, the right-hand side of (55) is strictly quasiconcave in s. Additionally,
dVπ(q)
ds
= 0
at s = 0 and s = 1, which are minima for which Vπ(q) = 0 (In fact, both these statements are true
for any function of the form Kxa(1− x)b for a, b ≥ 1).
As a consequence, the value σ ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes Vπ(q) with respect to s solves
2(1− σ) =
³
1 +
r
λ
´
σ, (57)
which yields
σ =
2λ
3λ+ r
. (58)
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The corresponding price is
P (σ) = φ ≡ 2λ(λ+ r)
(3λ+ r)2
. (59)
(Note that when r = 0, this yields the rational expectations equilibrium quantity q∗ = 2/3 and
price p∗ = 2/9. Also note that the price φ in (59) satisfies (??) for each r ≥ 0, λ > 0.)
Correspondingly, if the initial state is q > s, until it reaches s, q(t) solves
q0(t) = −λq(t)], (60)
which corresponds uniquely to the demand trajectory:
q(t) = qe−λt, (61)
and a similar computation yields the value function:
Vπ(q) =
1
2λ+ r
µ
q2 + q−
r
λ s(2+
r
λ )
∙
2λ(1− s)− rs
r
¸¶
(62)
which is also maximized with respect to s by the value of σ in (58).
Denote by π∗ the target policy with target σ. We shall now show that the target policy π∗
is optimal. For any given policy μ, if its value function is continuously diﬀerentiable, then the
corresponding Bellmanian Functional is defined by
Bμ(q, p) = pq − rVμ(q) + V 0μ (q)m(q, p). (63)
According to a well-known proposition, a policy μ is optimal if it satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman condition:
Bμ(q, p) ≤ 0 for all q, p. (64)
An alternative form for the last condition is
μ(q) = argmax
p
Bμ(q, p). (65)
This follows from the fact that, for all q,
Bμ[q, μ(q)] = 0,
which is readily verified. (In fact, this identity is true for any stationary policy whose value function
is C1.) Hence, from the above,
Bπ∗ [q, π∗(q)] = π∗(q)q − rVπ∗(q) + λ
µ
1− q − π
∗(q)
q
¶
V 0π∗ (q) = 0. (66)
It will be useful to define
G(q) ≡ q2 − λV 0π(q). (67)
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and write B(q, p) in the form,
B(q, p) = pq − rVπ(q) + λ
µ
1− q − p
q
¶
V 0π (q) (68)
= −rV (q) + λ(1− q)V 0(q) + p
q
G(q). (69)
Thus B(q, p) is linear in p, and the coeﬃcient of p is
G(q)
q
. Hence
argmax
p
Bπ(p, q) =
(
0, if G(q) < 0,
q, if G(q) > 0.
(70)
It will also be useful to define the stay-where-you-are policy by
p(t) = P [q(t)]. (71)
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote this policy by P . With this policy, q(t) = q(0) for all
t > 0 (see (31) , and its value function is
VP (q) =
P (q)q
r
=
q2(1− q)
r
. (72)
Case 1. 0 < q < σ: In this case π(q) = 0, and
Bπ[q, π(q)] = −rVπ(q) + λ(1− q)V 0π (q) = 0, (73)
so
λV 0π(q) =
rVπ(q)
1− q , (74a)
G(q) = q2 − rVπ(q)
1− q , (74b)
and from (72), it follows that
G(q) < 0⇔ Vπ(q) > VP (q). (75)
Suppose that the monopolist uses the policy π for 0 ≤ t < u, and then switches to the "stay-where-
you-are" policy P , from then on. Since her price is zero for 0 ≤ t < u, her resulting profit will
be
g(u) ≡ e−ruVP [q(u)] =
µ
1
r
¶
e−ru[q(u)]2[1− q(u)], (76)
where q(t) is determined by the diﬀerential equation q0(t) = 1 − q(t) on the interval [0, T ), with
q(0) = q. Note that
g(0) = VP (q), (77)
g(T ) = Vπ(q), (78)
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where, as before, T is the time at which q(t) reaches the target σ under the policy π. Diﬀerentiating
(76) with respect to u, and simplifying the resulting expression yields
g0(u) =
µ
1
r
¶
e−ru[q(u)][1− q(u)][2λ− (3λ+ r)q(u)] > 0 for 0 ≤ u < T, (79)
since
q(u) < σ =
2λ
3λ+ r
for 0 ≤ u < T. (80)
Hence, g(u) is strictly increasing in u and so
Vπ(q) = g(T ) > g(0) = VP (q), (81)
and using (75), Bπ(q, p) is maximized at p = 0.
Case 2. q > σ: In this case π(q) = q. Using an analogous argument, we find that
λV 0π(q) =
−rVπ(q) + q2
q
, (82)
which leads to a condition similar to (75),
G(q) > 0⇔ Vπ(q) > VP (q). (83)
The analogous expression for g is
g(u) ≡ q
Z u
0
e−rtq(t)dt+ e−ruVP [q(u)] (84)
= q
Z u
0
e−rtq(t)dt+
µ
1
r
¶
e−ru[q(u)]2[1− q(u)], (85)
where q(t) is defined by the diﬀerential equation
q0(t) = −λq(t), q(0) = q (86)
in [0, T ). Diﬀerentiating (85) with respect to u yields:
g0(u) = e−ru
µ
[q(u)]2 − [q(u)]2[1− q(u)] + 1
r
¡
2q(u)− 3[q(u)]2
¢
q0(u)
¶
,
which simplifies to:
g0(u) =
q(u)
r
e−ru [(3λ+ r)q(u)− 2λ] q(u), (87)
which is strictly positive, since
q(u) > σ =
2λ
3λ+ r
for 0 ≤ u < T. (88)
Therefore, g(u) is strictly increasing in u and so
Vπ(q) = g(T ) > g(0) = VP (q), (89)
and therefore, Bπ(q, p) is maximized at p = q.
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Finally, note that, from (74a) and (82),
V 0π(σ
−) = V 0π(σ
+) = V 0π(σ) =
σ2
λ
, (90)
G(σ) = 0, (91)
so Vπ is continuously diﬀerentiable for all q, and Bπ(σ, p) is independent of p. Hence Bπ satisfies
the Bellman Optimality Condition, which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1
Diﬀerentiating both sides of (31) with respect to λ yields
dV (σ)
dλ
=
8rλ
(r + 3λ)4
. (92)
Similarly, while taking into account that σ is a function of λ, diﬀerentiating both sides of with
respect to λ and simplifying yields
dV (q0)
dλ
=
4(r + λ)
(r + 3λ)3
µ
1− σ
1− q0
¶ r
λ
Ln
µ
1− q0
1− σ
¶
, (93)
which is strictly positive when (1− q0) > (1− σ).
Proof of Lemma 3
Denote the demand from consumers of type θ in period t as w(θ, t). First, consider the fraction
of consumers (1−ch) who remain from the prior period. Recall that a fraction λh of these consumers
of type θ notice p(t), form a shared expectation of demand qE(t, h), and decide whether or not to
adopt the product for period t. Therefore, if θ ≥ [p(t)/qE(t, h)], each consumer in the fraction
λh(1− ch) adopts the product, and if θ < [p(t)/qE(t, h)], then none of these consumers adopt the
product. The remaining fraction (1− λh)(1− ch) continue to do in period t what they were doing
in period t − h. Next, of the fraction ch of "new" consumers, a total fraction (λh)(ch) notice the
product and adopt it if θ ≥ [p(t)/qE(t, h)], and a total fraction ch(1 − λh) do not notice it, and
therefore, do not adopt it, independent of the value of θ. It follows that:
w(θ, t) =
(
λh+ (1− ch)(1− λh)w(θ, t− h), θ ≥ p(t)/qE(t, h),
(1− ch)(1− λh)w(θ, t− h) θ < p(t)/qE(t, h),
, (94)
and therefore,
w(θ, t)− w(θ, t− h) =
(
λh− [h(λ+ c)− cλh2]w(θ, t− h), θ ≥ p(t)/qE(t, h),
−[h(λ+ c)− cλh2]w(θ, t− h), θ < p(t)/qE(t, h).
. (95)
Dividing both sides by h and letting h tend to zero yields the time rate of change of demand for
consumers of type θ:
dw(θ, t)
dt
≡ lim
h→0
µ
w(θ, t)− w(θ, t− h)
h
¶
=
(
λ− [c+ λ]w(θ, t), θ ≥ p(t)/qE(t),
−[c+ λ]w(θ, t), θ < p(t)/qE(t).
(96)
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Proceeding as in Section 2.2, we compute q0(t) as
q0(t) =
1Z
0
µ
dw(θ, t)
dt
¶
dF (θ), (97)
which simplifies to
q0(t) = λ
∙
1− F
µ
p(t)
qE(t)
¶¸
− [λ+ c]q(t), (98)
and using the fact that qE(t) = q(t) for myopic customers, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2
The law of motion can be rewritten as
m(q, p) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0, q(t) = 0,
λ[1− p/q − kq], 0 < q ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p ≤ q,
−∞, 0 < q ≤ 1, p > q,
, (99)
where
k ≡ 1 + c
λ
≥ 1. (100)
Now consider an arbitrary target policy with target s. Starting at q < s, until q(t) reaches s, q(t)
satisfies the diﬀerential equation,
q0(t) = λ[1− kq(t)], q(0) = q, (101)
whose solution is
q(t) =
1
k
[1− e−λkt(1− kq)], (102)
and proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 1 yields the value function
V (q) =
1
r
s2[1− ks](1+
r
kλ)(1− kq)− rkλ , q < s (103)
The RHS of (103) is strictly quasiconcave for 0 < s ≤ 1, and it is maximized at
σ =
2λ
3kλ+ r
, (104)
which is our candidate optimal target. Correspondingly, starting at q > s, the value function solves
to being
V (q) =
1
2kλ+ r
µ
q2 + q−
r
kλ s(2+
r
kλ )
∙
2λ(1− ks)− rs
r
¸¶
, q > s, (105)
which is also maximized in s at the value of σ in (104).
Now, the Bellmanian functional for the target policy with target σ is
B(q, p) = pq − rV (q) +m(q, p)V 0(q), (106)
which simplifies to
B(q, p) = p
∙
q − λV
0(q)
q
¸
− [rV (q) + λ− λkV 0(q)]. (107)
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Recalling the function G(q) defined in (67)
G(q) = q2 − λV 0(q), (108)
it follows again from (107) that
argmax
p
B(q, p) =
(
0, if G(q) < 0,
q, if G(q) > 0.
(109)
Now, from below, diﬀerentiating both sides of (103) with respect to q and rearranging yields:
V 0(q) =
σ2
λ
µ
1− kσ
1− kq
¶[1+ rkλ ]
, (110)
which in turn implies that,
G(q) = q2
µ
1− f0(σ)
f0(q)
¶
, q < σ, (111)
where
f0(x) ≡ x2[1− kx][1+
r
kλ ] (112)
However, the function f0(x) is maximized at x = σ, which implies that f0(q) < f0(σ) for q < σ,
and therefore, according to (111), G(q) < 0 for q < σ. A similar computation of V 0(q), which is
omitted, verifies that G(q) > 0 for q > σ. Finally, one can verify that V1(σ−, σ) = V1(σ+, σ), and
this completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3
(a) Consider an arbitrary target policy with target s. Proceeding as we did in Section 3.1, we
shall first characterize the optimal target, starting from q(0) = q. We begin with the case of q < s.
Until q(t) reaches s, it satisfies the diﬀerential equation,
q0(t) = λ[1− q(t)]. (113)
As in Section 3.1, the value function for the target policy with target s is:
V (q, s) =
µ
1− s
1− q
¶ρ P (s)s
r
, (114)
where ρ =
r
λ
.
Using the expression (45)for P (s), we have
V (q, s) =
f(s)
r(1− q)ρ , where (115)
f(s) = (1− s)ρ+1
£
γs2 + (1− γ)ωs
¤
.
Hence the target that maximizes V (q, s) is the value of s that maximizes f(s). One verifies that
f 0(s) = (1− s)ρG(s), where (116)
G(s) = −γ(ρ+ 3)s2 + [2γ − (ρ+ 2)(1− γ)ω]s+ (1− γ)ω.
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Note that f 0(s) and G(s) have the same sign. Also, G is quadratic and concave, and G(0) =
(1 − γ)ω > 0. Hence f is maximized at the larger of the two roots of G(s) = 0. Call this root
σ(γ, ω); it is the optimal target. Note that it is independent of the starting state, q.
We now show that, for q < σ(γ, ω), the target policy with target σ(γ, ω) is optimal among all
policies. For this purpose, we abbreviate σ(γ, ω) to σ. The Bellmanian functional for this policy is
B(q, p) = pq − rV (q, σ) + λ
∙
1− p
γq + (1− γ)ω − q
¸
V1(q, σ). (117)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to p, we have
B2(q, p) = q −
λV1(q, σ)
γq + (1− γ)ω . (118)
From (115), we have
V1(q, σ) =
f(σ)
λ(1− q)ρ+1 ,
and hence
B2(q, p) = q −
f(σ)
(1− q)ρ+1 [γq + (1− γ)ω] .
It follows that B2(q, p) < 0 if and only if
(1− q)ρ+1
£
γq2 + (1− γ)ωq
¤
< f(σ), or
f(q) < f(σ),
which is true for q < σ. This completes the proof of the optimality of the target policy with target
σ in Case 1. The argument for Case 2, q > σ, is analogous, and is omitted. Finally, one can verify
that V1(σ−, σ) = V1(σ+, σ). This completes the proof of Part (a) of the theorem.
To prove Part (b), write G(s) in (116) in the form
G(s, γ) = γgb(s) + (1− γ)ga(s), where
ga(s) = −(ρ+ 3)s2 + 2s, (119)
gb(s) = −(ρ+ 2)ωs+ ω.
Recall that σ(γ, ω) is the larger root of
G[s, γ] = 0.
A standard "comparative statics" calculation yields
σ1(γ, ω) = −
gb[σ(γ, ω)]− ga[σ(γ, ω)]
γg0b[σ(γ, ω)] + (1− γ)g0a[σ(γ, ω)]
. (120)
Let σb be the positive root of gb(s) = 0 (the other root is 0), and let σa be the root of ga(s) = 0.
Then
σb =
2
ρ+ 3
, σa =
1
ρ+ 2
. (121)
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Figure 3: Illustrates the proof of part (b) of Theorem 3.
Note that
σb
2
< σa < σb. (122)
Note also that (1) gb(s) is decreasing and positive for σb2 ≤ s < σb;(2) ga(s) is decreasing, and is
negative for σa < s ≤ σb, and (3) σa < σ(γ, ω) < σb for 0 < γ < 1 (see Figure 3). Hence, by (120)
and (122), σ1(γ, ω) > 0 for 0 < γ < 1, which completes the proof of Part (b) of the theorem.
To prove part (c), first notice that, independent of the value of ω, part (b) establishes that for
0 < γ < 1:
1
2 + ρ
< σ(γ, ω) <
2
3 + ρ
. (123)
Also, from the second line of (116), σ is defined by
−γ(ρ+ 3)[σ(γ, ω)]2 + [2γ − (ρ+ 2)(1− γ)ω]σ(γ, ω) + (1− γ)ω = 0. (124)
Diﬀerentiating both sides of () with respect to ω and rearranging yields:
σ2(γ, ω) = −
µ
(1− γ)[(2 + ρ)σ(γ, ω)− 1)
2γ[((3 + ρ)σ(γ, ω)− 1)] + ω[1− γ](2 + ρ)
¶
. (125)
From (123), (2+ρ)σ(γ, ω) > 1, and thus both the numerator and the denominator of the expression
in parentheses on the LHS of (125) are strictly positive. This completes the proof.
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